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1. Natural resource management 
devolution : governance or govern-ability ?  
• 15 years of experiences, mainly driven by 
donors, NGOs and private operators; 
• Local management codes or conventions or 
chartes and their management committee for 
implementation  …linked to natural resource 
issues = Contracts ?
• Question : does community-based natural 
resource management foster local (and national) 
governance of resources ? 
2. Case Studies 
• Double process
– devolution/ decentralization 
– but often not a legal basis to devolution 
• Senegal
– Decentralization law (1996) and competences on 
forests to elected rural councils (CR)
– + Forestry law (PAFS 1998): agreement with CR 
within forestry law through projects and specific “local 
conventions”
– 30 conventions
2. Case Studies 
• Niger : 
– Forest Law (1002) : Devolution as a specific forest 
policy tools : transfer of access and commercial rights 
implemented through specific convention called “rural 
markets”; Projects-driven implementation
– Decentralization: no competences on forests but  
share of fiscal incomes of forest exploitation 
to”communes”
– 180 rural markets 560 000 ha (2003)
• Madagascar :
– Legal national act specific for devolution of natural 
resource management : Gelose Act (1996)
– Demand, steps, mediation, and revision of the 
contracts formalized in the act; 
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3. Method: why an analysis of the  
contract is useful?  
• Contract of not contract ? 
– Biding reciprocal agreement 
– Between identified parties (local populations, operators, public 
administrations, decentralization units)
– For exchanges of information, of rights, of resources (income, 
work, natural resources) ;
• Contract basis : a constructed initial situation ? 
• Content : what modalities to negotiate and build-up the 
agreement?
31. Basis of the contract : an 
ad’hoc constructed initial situation ? 
• Delimitation choices driven by an information concern: 
how to measure and verify ex-post the results of the 
contract?
• Delimitation of the resource base of the contract though 
resource inventory, then definition of the social frame of 
the contract (excepted Madagascar)
• Delimitation of the concerned social group through 
pluralism as a normative basis: contract parties as 
homogeneous ; Traditional as new elected power: 
– partly excluded in Madagascar
– included recently in Senegal but overlapping of competences
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32. Content : what modalities to 
negotiate and build-up the agreement? 
• Importance of the process of negotiating new 
rules = 
– threat point if no renegotiation of the contract (all 
rules)
– anticipation of lack of control
– Mediation and not only for diagnosis
• Degree of formalization of social relationships: 
– Aggregation of interests  (sensibilisation; diagnosis)
– Trade-off between parties (incomes, rights)
– Accountability (implementation)
























Subset = participation indicator 
4. Results : issues linked to the basis of the 
contract 
• Weak identification and integration of 
actors knowledge, values and preferences 
in management options 
• Spatial integration is more often performed 
• Spatial areas are defined for project 
consistency but raise questions for 
– actors participation  
– Coherence of local management
4. Results : Issues linked to the content of 
the contract
• What transfer of authority through contracts? 
– Decision-making process for access and sharing rules 
depend on the relative power of the structures
– and not on the negotiation process (no real trade off);
• Legal imprecision of the definition of the 
“communities” and of their rights after the contract:
– no court claims if no respect of the contract
– No real empowerment: but used to structure the rural 
populations for being better mobilized for environmental 
stakes (less rights after than before)
4. Discussion 
• CBNRM = discussion, negotiation or learning fora ?
• No, as long as natural resource management is 
considered as two problems to be solved:  
– of information  (mainly of the regulator)
– of control (and of costs of control and agreement) 
• Contracts= a tool to measure 
– The local political and traditional powers; 
– The social capital to be mobilized to be able to design a 
real devolution
5. Discussion
• Internal legitimacy of contracts = 
– Not guaranted by the territorial legitimacy of the 
parties according to the resource base 
– Choice of members? and exclusion ( 
Madagascar? Senegal “non residents”) 
– Need of social capital and power for the social 
group acting as partie of the contract 
– Participation of population? and voluntary 
participation to project activities and incomes 
(Senegal, Niger)
Discussion
• External legitimacy of local natural resource 
management institutions : community-based 
management contracts in the perspective of 
changing the legal and juridical policy framework ;
• External legitimacy : Contradictory with 
decentralization 
– As regard the role of elected territorial councils, designed 
by the decentralization laws = potential for conflicts; 
– No negotiation for defining the competences of local 
management committee designed for intervention;   
5. Discussion
• Issues to be tackled
– Transparency in resource exploitation 
decisions and environmental impact 
– Redistribution of incomes AND OF 
COSTS and environmental impact 
Conclusion 
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